How Regime Theory and the Economic Theory of International Environmental Cooperation Can Learn from Each Other

45 Pages Posted: 21 Aug 2001 Last revised: 7 Jul 2010

See all articles by Eric Neumayer

Eric Neumayer

London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)

Date Written: July 7, 2010

Abstract

Economic theorists of international environmental cooperation and regime theorists who focus on the environment ask the same two basic research questions: why does international environmental cooperation emerge in some cases, but not in others, and why is cooperation 'wide' and 'deep' in some cases, but not in others? Unfortunately, the two schools of thought do not collaborate much in their respective attempts to answer these and related questions. Instead, mutual neglect is the general rule. This paper tries to show how regime theory can learn from the findings of the economic theory of international environmental cooperation and vice versa and how both can fruitfully learn from each other. An exploitation of mutual learning opportunities is likely to lead to a more comprehensive understanding of international environmental cooperation and can ultimately result in better informed policy advice.

Keywords: Multilateral environmental agreements, trade sanctions, issue linkage, free riding, compliance, unilateral action, rules, norms and conventions

Suggested Citation

Neumayer, Eric, How Regime Theory and the Economic Theory of International Environmental Cooperation Can Learn from Each Other (July 7, 2010). Global Environmental Politics, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 122-147, February 2001. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=268608

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London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) ( email )

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