Uber's Drivers: Information Asymmetries and Control in Dynamic Work

Alex Rosenblat

Data & Society Research Institute

Luke Stark

New York University (NYU)

October 15, 2015

This empirical study explores labor in the on-demand economy using the rideshare service Uber as a case study. By conducting sustained monitoring of online driver forums and interviewing Uber drivers, we explore worker experiences within the on-demand economy. We argue that Uber’s digitally and algorithmically mediated system of flexible employment builds new forms of surveillance and control into the experience of using the system, which result in asymmetries around information and power for workers. In Uber’s system, algorithms, CSRs, passengers, semiautomated performance evaluations, and the rating system all act as a combined substitute for direct managerial control over drivers, but distributed responsibility for remote worker management also exacerbates power asymmetries between Uber and its drivers. Our study of the Uber driver experience points to the need for greater attention to the role of platform disintermediation in shaping power relations and communications between employers and workers.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 17

Keywords: digital labor, on-demand economy, Uber, interaction design, flexible employment, ridesharing, algorithm, data, middle manager, rating, surge pricing, entrepreneurship, algorithm, predictive scheduling, sharing economy, workplace surveillance

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Date posted: November 5, 2015 ; Last revised: December 17, 2015

Suggested Citation

Rosenblat, Alex and Stark, Luke, Uber's Drivers: Information Asymmetries and Control in Dynamic Work (October 15, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2686227 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2686227

Contact Information

Alex Rosenblat (Contact Author)
Data & Society Research Institute ( email )
36 West 20th Street
New York,, NY
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.datasociety.net
Luke Stark
New York University (NYU) ( email )
Bobst Library, E-resource Acquisitions
20 Cooper Square 3rd Floor
New York, NY 10003-711
United States
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