The Uneasy Relationship between EU Environmental and Economic Policies, and the Role of the CJEU

A version of this paper will appear in B. Sjåfjell and A. Wiesbrock, Sustainable Public Procurement (Cambridge University Press, Forthcoming).

UCD Working Papers in Law, Criminology & Socio-Legal Studies Research Paper No. 13/2015

20 Pages Posted: 5 Nov 2015

See all articles by Suzanne Kingston

Suzanne Kingston

Sutherland School of Law, University College Dublin

Date Written: November 5, 2015

Abstract

This paper considers the constitutional imperative to integrate environmental protection requirements into the EU's economic policies, and examines how this has been operationalized in practice. It argues that, compared to the other EU institutions, the CJEU has continued to demonstrate leadership in giving effect to the integration imperative in the economic context. This is evidenced by a raft of recent judgments on the environment/economic interface, which in turn are coming before the Court due to the popularity, at Member State and EU levels, of market-based environmental instruments. Overall, the CJEU has shown itself to be a constitutionalist actor which is serious about the requirement to achieve real, substantive integration of environmental protection requirements into the EU’s economic policies, as required by Article 11 TFEU.

Keywords: environmental protection, EU, economic policy, CJEU, TFEU

Suggested Citation

Kingston, Suzanne, The Uneasy Relationship between EU Environmental and Economic Policies, and the Role of the CJEU (November 5, 2015). A version of this paper will appear in B. Sjåfjell and A. Wiesbrock, Sustainable Public Procurement (Cambridge University Press, Forthcoming). , UCD Working Papers in Law, Criminology & Socio-Legal Studies Research Paper No. 13/2015, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2686526 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2686526

Suzanne Kingston (Contact Author)

Sutherland School of Law, University College Dublin ( email )

Belfield
Dublin 4
Ireland

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