Antidumping and Market Competition: Implications for Emerging Economies

34 Pages Posted: 5 Nov 2015

See all articles by Chad P. Bown

Chad P. Bown

Peterson Institute for International Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Rachel McCulloch

Brandeis University - Department of Economics; Brandeis University - International Business School

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 2015

Abstract

While the original justification of the antidumping laws in the industrial economies was to protect domestic consumers against predation by foreign suppliers, by the early 1990s the laws and their use had evolved so much that the opposite concern arose. Rather than attacking anti-competitive behavior, dumping complaints by domestic firms were being used to facilitate collusion among suppliers and enforce cartel arrangements. This paper examines the predation and anti-competitiveness issues from the perspective of the “new users” of antidumping — the major emerging economies for which antidumping is now a major tool in the trade policy arsenal. We examine these concerns in light of important ways in which the world economy and international trading system have been changing since the early 1990s, including more firms and more countries participating in international trade, but also more extensive links among suppliers and consumers through multinational firm activity and vertical specialization.

Keywords: Antidumping, temporary trade barriers, competition, antitrust, WTO

JEL Classification: F13

Suggested Citation

Bown, Chad P. and McCulloch, Rachel, Antidumping and Market Competition: Implications for Emerging Economies (October 2015). Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research Paper No. RSCAS 2015/76, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2686555 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2686555

Chad P. Bown (Contact Author)

Peterson Institute for International Economics ( email )

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Rachel McCulloch

Brandeis University - Department of Economics ( email )

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Waltham, MA 02454-9110
United States
781-736-2245 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://people.brandeis.edu/~rmccullo/

Brandeis University - International Business School ( email )

Mailstop 021
Waltham, MA 02454-9110
United States
781-736-2245 (Phone)
781-736-2269 (Fax)

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