Supreme Court Amicus Brief of 19 Corporate Law Professors, Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, No. 14-915

55 Pages Posted: 8 Nov 2015

See all articles by John C. Coates, IV

John C. Coates, IV

Harvard Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Lucian A. Bebchuk

Harvard Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Bernard S. Black

Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law

John C. Coffee

Columbia Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); American Academy of Arts & Sciences

James D. Cox

Duke University School of Law

Ronald J. Gilson

Stanford Law School; Columbia Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Stanford Law School

Jeffrey N. Gordon

Columbia Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Lawrence A. Hamermesh

Widener University Delaware Law School; Institute for Law and Economics

Henry Hansmann

Yale University - Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Robert J. Jackson, Jr.

New York University School of Law

Marcel Kahan

New York University School of Law; European Corporate Governance Institute

Vikramaditya S. Khanna

University of Michigan Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Michael Klausner

Stanford Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Reinier Kraakman

Harvard Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute

Donald C. Langevoort

Georgetown University Law Center

Brian JM Quinn

BC Law School

Edward B. Rock

New York University School of Law; European Corporate Governance Institute

Mark J. Roe

Harvard Law School

Helen S. Scott

New York University (NYU)

Date Written: November 6, 2015

Abstract

The Supreme Court has looked to the rights of corporate shareholders in determining the rights of union members and non-members to control political spending, and vice versa. The Court sometimes assumes that if shareholders disapprove of corporate political expression, they can easily sell their shares or exercise control over corporate spending. This assumption is mistaken. Because of how capital is saved and invested, most individual shareholders cannot obtain full information about corporate political activities, even after the fact, nor can they prevent their savings from being used to speak in ways with which they disagree. Individual shareholders have no “opt out” rights or practical ability to avoid subsidizing corporate political expression with which they disagree. Nor do individuals have the practical option to refrain from putting their savings into equity investments, as doing so would impose damaging economic penalties and ignore conventional financial guidance for individual investors.

Keywords: corporate politics, union politics, First Amendment, shareholder rights, corporate speech

JEL Classification: D91, G32, G11, G18, G34, G38, K22, K31, J83

Suggested Citation

Coates, John C. and Bebchuk, Lucian A. and Black, Bernard S. and Coffee, John C. and Cox, James D. and Gilson, Ronald J. and Gordon, Jeffrey N. and Hamermesh, Lawrence A. and Hansmann, Henry and Jackson, Jr., Robert J. and Kahan, Marcel and Khanna, Vikramaditya S. and Klausner, Michael D. and Kraakman, Reinier H. and Langevoort, Donald C. and Quinn, Brian JM and Rock, Edward B. and Roe, Mark J. and Scott, Helen S., Supreme Court Amicus Brief of 19 Corporate Law Professors, Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, No. 14-915 (November 6, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2687241 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2687241

John C. Coates (Contact Author)

Harvard Law School ( email )

1575 Massachusetts
Hauser 406
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Lucian A. Bebchuk

Harvard Law School ( email )

Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-3138 (Phone)
617-812-0554 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
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1000 Brussels
Belgium

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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Bernard S. Black

Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law ( email )

375 E. Chicago Ave
Chicago, IL 60611
United States
312-503-2784 (Phone)

John C. Coffee

Columbia Law School ( email )

435 West 116th Street
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United States
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212-854-7946 (Fax)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
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1000 Brussels
Belgium

American Academy of Arts & Sciences

136 Irving Street
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United States

James D. Cox

Duke University School of Law ( email )

210 Science Drive
Box 90362
Durham, NC 27708
United States
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Ronald J. Gilson

Stanford Law School ( email )

559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States
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Columbia Law School ( email )

435 West 116th Street
New York, NY 10025
United States
212-854-1655 (Phone)
212-854-7946 (Fax)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Stanford Law School ( email )

559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States
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Jeffrey N. Gordon

Columbia Law School ( email )

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Ctr. for Law and Economic Studies
New York, NY 10027
United States
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212-854-7946 (Fax)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
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1000 Brussels
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HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

Lawrence A. Hamermesh

Widener University Delaware Law School ( email )

4601 Concord Pike
Wilmington, DE 19803-0406
United States
302-477-2132 (Phone)
302-477-2257 (Fax)

Institute for Law and Economics

3501 Sansom Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States

Henry Hansmann

Yale University - Law School ( email )

P.O. Box 208215
New Haven, CT 06520-8215
United States
203-432-7101 (Phone)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

Robert J. Jackson, Jr.

New York University School of Law ( email )

40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States

Marcel Kahan

New York University School of Law ( email )

40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States
212-998-6268 (Phone)
212-995-4341 (Fax)

European Corporate Governance Institute ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Vikramaditya S. Khanna

University of Michigan Law School ( email )

625 South State Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1215
United States
734-615-6959 (Phone)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Michael D. Klausner

Stanford Law School ( email )

559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States
650-723-6433 (Phone)
650-725-0253 (Fax)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Reinier H. Kraakman

Harvard Law School ( email )

1575 Massachusetts
Hauser 406
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-496-3586 (Phone)
617-496-6118 (Fax)

European Corporate Governance Institute ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Donald C. Langevoort

Georgetown University Law Center ( email )

600 New Jersey Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001
United States
202-662-9832 (Phone)
202-662-9412 (Fax)

Brian JM Quinn

BC Law School ( email )

885 Centre Street
Newton, MA 02459-1163
United States

Edward B. Rock

New York University School of Law ( email )

40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Mark J. Roe

Harvard Law School ( email )

Griswold 502
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-8099 (Phone)
617-495-4299 (Fax)

Helen S. Scott

New York University (NYU) ( email )

Bobst Library, E-resource Acquisitions
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New York, NY 10003-711
United States

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