A Foundation for the Conception of Law as Practical Reason
28 Pages Posted: 8 Nov 2015
Date Written: January 7, 2015
This essay is to be understood as primarily a discussion of one particular version of the conception of law as practical reason: Alexy's. But my ultimate concern here is with the foundation of a whole tradition of legal philosophy — the conception of law as practical reason, especially in its Kantian variant — and not just with one theory of law in that Alexy's account will be assessed by its ability to legitimise the appeal to practical reason to interpret, and make sense of, law as a system for guiding and justifying conduct. Thus, in the perspective endorsed in this study, the analysis and evaluation of Alexy's conception of law as practical reason are to be considered part and parcel of a broader attempt to subject the foundation of the conception of law as practical reason to critical scrutiny by so arriving at a critical assessment of that conception in general.
Keywords: Law, Alexy, Kant, practical reason, foundation
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation