26 Pages Posted: 14 Nov 2015 Last revised: 14 Dec 2017
Date Written: December 13, 2017
We study a persuasion game between a sender and a group of voters. When the sender can access any information structure, he can always persuade the group to make his preferred decision. When the sender is restricted to using only minimal winning coalitions, he sends private and correlated signals to take advantage of the voters' heterogeneous preferences. The optimal persuasion structure in the latter case induces multiple winning coalitions for the sender's preferred action. Interestingly, some of the winning coalitions involve voters who are not the easiest to persuade. The insight from pivotal persuasion is then applied to understand (i) the use of non-monotone voting rules, and (ii) the benefit of private persuasion when voters' signals are independent.
Keywords: Bayesian Persuasion, Voting, Selective Communication, Private Persuasion, Multiple Winning Coalitions
JEL Classification: D72, D83
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation