Pivotal Persuasion

19 Pages Posted: 14 Nov 2015 Last revised: 27 Sep 2016

Jimmy Chan

Shanghai University of Finance and Economics

Seher Gupta

New York University (NYU) - Department of Economics

Fei Li

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill

Yun Wang

Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE), Xiamen University; University of Pittsburgh

Date Written: September 23, 2016

Abstract

We study a Bayesian persuasion game between a sender and a group of voters. The sender is restricted to using only minimal winning coalitions. We show that the sender sends private and correlated signals to take advantage of the voters' heterogenous preferences. The optimal persuasion structure induces multiple winning coalitions for the sender's preferred action. Interestingly, some of the winning coalitions may involve voters who are not among those who are the easiest to persuade.

Keywords: Bayesian Persuasion, Voting, Selective Communication, Private Persuasion, Multiple Winning Coalitions

JEL Classification: D72, D83

Suggested Citation

Chan, Jimmy and Gupta, Seher and Li, Fei and Wang, Yun, Pivotal Persuasion (September 23, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2688044 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2688044

Jimmy Chan

Shanghai University of Finance and Economics ( email )

777 Guoding Road
Shanghai, Shanghai 200433
China

Seher Gupta

New York University (NYU) - Department of Economics ( email )

269 Mercer Street, 7th Floor
New York, NY 10011
United States

Fei Li (Contact Author)

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill ( email )

102 Ridge Road
Chapel Hill, NC NC 27514
United States

Yun Wang

University of Pittsburgh ( email )

4901 Wesley Posvar Hall
230 South Bouquet Street
Pittsburgh, PA 15260
United States

Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE), Xiamen University ( email )

A 307, Economics Building
Xiamen, Fujian 10246
China

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