Strategy Proofness and Unanimity in Private Good Economies with Single-Peaked Preferences

14 Pages Posted: 10 Nov 2015 Last revised: 6 Jan 2017

See all articles by Mostapha Diss

Mostapha Diss

University of Lyon 2 - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE)

Ahmed Doghmi

Mohammadia School of Engineering

Abdelmonaim Tlidi

University of Marrakech

Date Written: January 2017

Abstract

In this paper we examine the relation between strategy-proofness and unanimity in a domain of private good economies with single-peaked preferences. We prove that, under a mild condition, a social choice function satisfies strategy-proofness if and only if it is unanimous. As implication, we show that when the property of citizen sovereignty holds, strategy proofness and Maskin monotonicity become equivalent. We also give applications to implementation literature: We provide a full characterization for dominant strategy implementation, standard Nash implementation, and partially honest Nash implementation and we prove that these theories are equivalent.

Keywords: Strategy-proofness; Unanimity; Maskin monotonicity; Private good economies; Single-peaked preferences

JEL Classification: C72, D71

Suggested Citation

Diss, Mostapha and Doghmi, Ahmed and Tlidi, Abdelmonaim, Strategy Proofness and Unanimity in Private Good Economies with Single-Peaked Preferences (January 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2688465 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2688465

Mostapha Diss (Contact Author)

University of Lyon 2 - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE) ( email )

93, chemin des Mouilles
Ecully, 69130
France

Ahmed Doghmi

Mohammadia School of Engineering ( email )

Avenue Ibnsina B.P. 765 Agdal
Rabat
Morocco

Abdelmonaim Tlidi

University of Marrakech ( email )

4000 Marrakech
United States

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