Strategy Proofness and Unanimity in Private Good Economies with Single-Peaked Preferences
14 Pages Posted: 10 Nov 2015 Last revised: 6 Jan 2017
Date Written: January 2017
In this paper we examine the relation between strategy-proofness and unanimity in a domain of private good economies with single-peaked preferences. We prove that, under a mild condition, a social choice function satisfies strategy-proofness if and only if it is unanimous. As implication, we show that when the property of citizen sovereignty holds, strategy proofness and Maskin monotonicity become equivalent. We also give applications to implementation literature: We provide a full characterization for dominant strategy implementation, standard Nash implementation, and partially honest Nash implementation and we prove that these theories are equivalent.
Keywords: Strategy-proofness; Unanimity; Maskin monotonicity; Private good economies; Single-peaked preferences
JEL Classification: C72, D71
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