A Fair Procedure in a Marriage Market
32 Pages Posted: 15 Nov 2015 Last revised: 4 Jan 2018
Date Written: May 15, 2014
The celebrated Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (DAA) due to Gale and Shapley (1962) always produces an extremal matching by favoring one side of the market at the expense of the other. This favoritism arises because only one side makes proposals. I propose a new algorithm wherein both sides of the market propose in a manner similar to the DAA. The proposed algorithm always yields a stable matching. Moreover, the outcome is often a non-extremal matching. Additionally, the algorithm does not distinguish (ex-ante) between men and women at any stage. The ex-post distinction arises primarily because in every round potential cycles are formed, that are broken arbitrarily. Lastly, the algorithm can be computed in polynomial time and hence, from a practical standpoint, can be used in markets where fairness considerations are important.
Keywords: Matching, Market Design, Algorithm, Fairness
JEL Classification: C72, C78, D47
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation