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Incentives for Large-Scale Arbitration: How Policymakers Can Influence Party Behaviour (Chapter)

Dossier XIII: Class and Group Actions in Arbitration (ICC Institute of World Business Law, anticipated 2016)

University of Missouri School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2015-27

33 Pages Posted: 13 Nov 2015  

S.I. Strong

University of Missouri School of Law

Date Written: November 11, 2015

Abstract

At this point, the future of large-scale arbitration (i.e., class, mass and collective procedures) can best be described as mixed. On the one hand, class arbitration has been curtailed in the United States as a result of various US Supreme Court decisions upholding waivers of large-scale suits in arbitration. On the other hand, mass and multiparty arbitration in investment proceedings appears to be on the rise. Collective arbitration seems to exist somewhere between these two extremes, since there are an increasing number of collective procedures around the world (for example, various types of collective arbitration can currently be found in Spain, Germany and the United States) but parties appear to use such mechanisms relatively infrequently.

The uneven status of large-scale arbitration raises the question of why parties and states choose to use or develop class, mass or collective procedures. To answer this question, it is necessary to analyse the legal and social environments in which these procedures exist to determine whether parties have sufficient incentives to pursue large-scale arbitration and whether states can or should do more to promote these forms of dispute resolution.

This chapter attempts to address these concerns by considering the use and availability of incentives for large-scale arbitration and in particular whether and to what extent lawmakers can or should seek to influence party behaviour through default rules and other policymaking tools. In so doing, this chapter attempts to provide parties, practitioners and policymakers with a better understanding of how class, mass and collective arbitration operate within various legal and social environments and how the choice of certain legal frameworks can optimize both public and private values.

Keywords: class arbitration, mass arbitration, collective arbitration, class actions, comparative law, law and economics, default rules, ADR, incentives, consumer arbitration, investment arbitration, commercial arbitration, international arbitration, public policy

Suggested Citation

Strong, S.I., Incentives for Large-Scale Arbitration: How Policymakers Can Influence Party Behaviour (Chapter) (November 11, 2015). Dossier XIII: Class and Group Actions in Arbitration (ICC Institute of World Business Law, anticipated 2016); University of Missouri School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2015-27. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2688754

S.I. Strong (Contact Author)

University of Missouri School of Law ( email )

Missouri Avenue & Conley Avenue
Columbia, MO 65211
United States

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