Law's Artifactual Nature: How Legal Institutions Generate Normativity

George Pavlakos and Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco (eds), Reasons and Intentions in Law and Practical Agency (Cambridge University Press, 2015) pp. 247-266

20 Pages Posted: 13 Nov 2015 Last revised: 21 Nov 2015

Date Written: November 11, 2015

Abstract

I argue that law is best understood as an institutionalized abstract artifact. Using the ideas of John Searle on institutions and Amie Thomasson on artifacts, I show how the law is capable of generating new reasons for action, arguing against recent work by David Enoch who holds that legal reason-giving is ultimately a form of triggering conditional reasons.

Keywords: jurisprudence, legal norms, institutions, artifacts, John Searle, Amie Thomasson, David Enoch

Suggested Citation

Ehrenberg, Kenneth M., Law's Artifactual Nature: How Legal Institutions Generate Normativity (November 11, 2015). George Pavlakos and Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco (eds), Reasons and Intentions in Law and Practical Agency (Cambridge University Press, 2015) pp. 247-266. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2689401

Kenneth M. Ehrenberg (Contact Author)

University of Surrey - School of Law ( email )

United Kingdom

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