The Private Provision of Excludable Public Goods: An Inefficiency Result

Posted: 14 Nov 2015

See all articles by Tore Ellingsen

Tore Ellingsen

Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Economics; Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) - Department of Economics

Elena Paltseva

Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE); New Economic School (NES)

Date Written: October 12, 2012

Abstract

Does voluntary contracting suffice for the efficient provision of excludable public goods? Even in a complete information environment, we find that the answer is negative. The reason is that some agents may profit from not participating at the provision stage, but instead negotiate access ex post.

Keywords: Contracting, Externalities, Club goods, Free-riding

Suggested Citation

Ellingsen, Tore and Paltseva, Elena, The Private Provision of Excludable Public Goods: An Inefficiency Result (October 12, 2012). Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 96, No. 9-10, 2012. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2689714

Tore Ellingsen (Contact Author)

Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 6501
Sveavagen 65
S-113 83 Stockholm
Sweden
+46 8 736 9260 (Phone)
+46 8 31 3207 (Fax)

Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) - Department of Economics

Helleveien 30
N-5035 Bergen
Norway

Elena Paltseva

Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE) ( email )

P.O. Box 6501
S-113 83 Stockholm, 11383
Sweden

New Economic School (NES) ( email )

100A Novaya Street
Moscow, Skolkovo 143026
Russia

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