The Private Provision of Excludable Public Goods: An Inefficiency Result
Posted: 14 Nov 2015
Date Written: October 12, 2012
Abstract
Does voluntary contracting suffice for the efficient provision of excludable public goods? Even in a complete information environment, we find that the answer is negative. The reason is that some agents may profit from not participating at the provision stage, but instead negotiate access ex post.
Keywords: Contracting, Externalities, Club goods, Free-riding
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Ellingsen, Tore and Paltseva, Elena, The Private Provision of Excludable Public Goods: An Inefficiency Result (October 12, 2012). Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 96, No. 9-10, 2012. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2689714
Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) - Department of Economics
Helleveien 30
N-5035 Bergen
Norway
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