Peace Agreements Without Commitment

35 Pages Posted: 15 Nov 2015

See all articles by Carmen Bevia

Carmen Bevia

Universidad de Alicante

Luis C. Corchón

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics

Date Written: November 13, 2009

Abstract

We present a model of rational and fully informed players. We show that in absence of binding agreements, in many cases, war can be avoided by transferring resources from one player into another. In most cases the rich country transfers money to the poor country. But when the military proficiency of the rich country is sufficiently high, the poor country stops the war by transferring part of its resources to the rich country. War cannot be avoided when inequality is sufficiently large or the cost of war is small enough,

Keywords: Transfers, peace, war, agreements

JEL Classification: C72, D

Suggested Citation

Bevia, Carmen and Corchón Diaz, Luis Carlos, Peace Agreements Without Commitment (November 13, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2690356 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2690356

Carmen Bevia

Universidad de Alicante ( email )

Campus de San Vicente, sn
Alicante, 03690
Spain

Luis Carlos Corchón Diaz (Contact Author)

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics ( email )

Calle Madrid 126
Getafe, 28903
Spain

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