Trade, Technologies, and the Evolution of Corporate Governance

43 Pages Posted: 16 Nov 2015

See all articles by Jan Schymik

Jan Schymik

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU)

Date Written: November 2015

Abstract

This paper develops an analytical framework to study how corporate governance is shaped by product market globalization and technological progress. Using U.S. firm and industry level data, I first document two empirical patterns. First, higher levels of industry trade openness and productivity are associated with higher levels of competition for managerial talent. Second, U.S. firms choose weaker governance rules when the labor market for managerial talent becomes more competitive. To explain these patterns in a theoretical framework, I introduce agency problems at the firm level into a general equilibrium open economy model with firm- and manager-heterogeneity. Trade and technological progress increase the competition for managers and thus lead to managerial superstar effects such that reservation wages for the most talented managers in the economy increase. This affects the agency problems inside firms and endogenously induces firms to create incentives with performance payments instead of tight governance. Consistently with the empirical observations, comparative statics exercises suggest that trade integration and technological progress can erode the average quality of firm governance and increase CEO compensation in the economy due to these managerial superstar effects.

Keywords: agency problems in international trade, international trade and firm organization, endogenous managerial entrenchment, corporate governance and CEO compensation

JEL Classification: F1, F16, G34, J33, L22, O33

Suggested Citation

Schymik, Jan, Trade, Technologies, and the Evolution of Corporate Governance (November 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2691017 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2691017

Jan Schymik (Contact Author)

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) ( email )

Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1
Munich, DE Bavaria 80539
Germany

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
89
Abstract Views
1,154
rank
336,368
PlumX Metrics