Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=269124
 
 

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Open Access To Broadband Networks: A Case Study Of The AOL/Time Warner Merger


Daniel L. Rubinfeld


University of California at Berkeley - School of Law; NYU Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Hal J. Singer


Economists Incorporated


UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 54

Abstract:     
This Article provides a framework for the analysis of the potential effects of the recent AOL/Time Warner merger on the markets forbroadband Internet access and broadband Internet content. We consider two anticompetitive strategies that a vertically integrated firm such as AOL Time Warner, offering both broadband transport and portal services, could in theory profitably pursue. First, an integrated provider could engage in conduit discrimination?insulating its own conduit from competition by limiting its distribution of affiliated content and services over rival platforms. Second, an integrated provider could engage in content discrimination?insulating its own affiliated content from competition by blocking or degrading the quality of outside content. After examining the competitive conditions in the broadband portal and transport markets, we evaluate the post-merger incentives of AOL Time Warner to engage in either or both forms of discrimination.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 46

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Date posted: May 7, 2001  

Suggested Citation

Rubinfeld, Daniel L. and Singer, Hal J., Open Access To Broadband Networks: A Case Study Of The AOL/Time Warner Merger. Berkeley Technology Law Journal, Vol. 16, No. 2, Spring 2001. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=269124 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.269124

Contact Information

Daniel L. Rubinfeld (Contact Author)
University of California at Berkeley - School of Law ( email )
Boalt Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720-7200
United States
(510) 642-1959 (Phone)
(510) 642-3767 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.berkeley.edu/faculty/rubinfeldd
NYU Law School ( email )
44 West Fourth Street, Suite 9-53
New York, NY 10012-1126
United States
(212) 992 8834 (Phone)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Hal J. Singer
Economists Incorporated ( email )
2121 K Street N.W.
Suite 1100
Washington, DC 20037
United States
202-747-3520 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.ei.com/viewprofessional.php?id=71
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