The Nature of Legal Change on the U.S. Supreme Court: Jurisprudential Regimes Theory and its Alternatives

American Journal of Political Science 59(4): 880-995

16 Pages Posted: 20 Nov 2015

Date Written: October 1, 2015

Abstract

Jurisprudential regimes theory (JRT) posits that legal change on the U.S. Supreme Court occurs in a drastic, structural- break-like manner. Methodological debates present conflicting evidence for JRT, which has implications for the important law versus ideology debate. We confront this debate by first elaborating two alternative theoretical perspectives to JRT— evolutionary change and legal stability. Our analytical framework focuses on two key substantive effects of jurisprudential categories on the Court’s case outcomes — relative differences between categories over multiple time periods and longitudinal differences across time periods. Importantly, different pieces of empirical evidence can provide support for different dynamic processes. The extent to which “law matters” is not necessarily tied to one particular model of legal change. Empirical analysis of updated and backdated free expression data generates key findings consistent with JRT, legal stability, and evolutionary change. We discuss the implications of the results for understanding legal change and legal influence.

Suggested Citation

Bartels, Brandon L. and O'Geen, Andrew J., The Nature of Legal Change on the U.S. Supreme Court: Jurisprudential Regimes Theory and its Alternatives (October 1, 2015). American Journal of Political Science 59(4): 880-995, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2691425

Brandon L. Bartels (Contact Author)

George Washington University ( email )

Dept. of Political Science, GWU
2115 G Street NW, Suite 440
Washington, DC 20052
United States
202-642-1459 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://home.gwu.edu/~bartels

Andrew J. O'Geen

Davidson College ( email )

Box 7134
Davidson, NC 28035-6964
United States

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