International Cooperation on Public Procurement Regulation

34 Pages Posted: 16 Nov 2015

See all articles by Bernard Hoekman

Bernard Hoekman

Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies; European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: November 1, 2015

Abstract

Most governments have yet to agree to binding disciplines on government procurement regulation, whether in the WTO or a preferential trade agreement. Empirical research suggests that reciprocally-negotiated market access commitments have not been effective in inducing governments to buy more from foreign suppliers. Foreign sourcing by governments has been rising for most countries, however, independent of whether States have made international commitments to this effect – although there is some evidence that this trend was reversed post-2008 in several countries that had the freedom to do so. The stylized facts suggest a reconsideration of the design of international cooperation on procurement regulation, with less emphasis on specific market access reciprocity and greater focus on good procurement practice and principles, efforts to boost transparency, and pursuit of pro-competitive policies more generally.

Keywords: Government procurement, regulation, trade agreements, WTO

JEL Classification: F13, H57

Suggested Citation

Hoekman, Bernard, International Cooperation on Public Procurement Regulation (November 1, 2015). Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research Paper No. RSCAS 2015/88. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2691491 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2691491

Bernard Hoekman (Contact Author)

Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies ( email )

Fiesole, Tuscany
Italy

European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) ( email )

Villa La Fonte, via delle Fontanelle 18
50016 San Domenico di Fiesole
Florence, Florence 50014
Italy

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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