The Stable Demand Set General Characterization and Application to Majority Games
Ohio State University Working Paper No. 0103
27 Pages Posted: 8 May 2001
Date Written: March 2001
The cooperative solution concept introduced here, the Stable Demand Set, contains the Core and is included in the Zhou Bargaining Set, eliminating the "dominated" coalition structures. The demand vectors belonging to the Stable Demand Set are self-stable. In the class of constant-sum homogeneous weighted majority games the Stable Demand Set is non-empty and predicts a unique stable demand vector, namely a proportional distribution within minimal winning coalitions. The noncooperative implementation of the Stable Demand Set is obtained for all the games that satisfy the one-stage property.
Keywords: Stable Demands, Undominated Coalition Structures, Weighted Major-ity Games, Bargaining Sets
JEL Classification: C7
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation