Holding the Executive Accountable in Egypt Impeachment: A Losing Case

4(1) University of Baltimore Journal of International Law, 2015, Forthcoming

49 Pages Posted: 22 Nov 2015

See all articles by Mohamed Abdelaal

Mohamed Abdelaal

Alexandria University - Faculty of Law; Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law

Date Written: November 20, 2015

Abstract

This paper examines the impeachment mechanism in Egypt after the 2011 Revolution and the 2013 events and the removal of Presidents Hosni Mubarak and Mohamed Morsi. In doing so, the paper will provide a critical analysis to the impeachment clauses in both the 2012 and 2014 Constitutions, in an attempt to discover to what extent the pre 2011 impeachment differs from that of post 2011. Further, it addresses the issue of whether the recall election could make a good alternative to impeachment in Egypt. Specifically, we will briefly shed light on the history of the recall device as well as its emergence as one feature of direct democracy. Our focus will then shift to discussing the possibility of adopting the recall device in Egypt and the challenges that might face such adoption. Eventually, we will propose a recall provision that could replace impeachment in Egypt’s current constitution.

Suggested Citation

Abdelaal, Mohamed, Holding the Executive Accountable in Egypt Impeachment: A Losing Case (November 20, 2015). 4(1) University of Baltimore Journal of International Law, 2015, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2693628

Mohamed Abdelaal (Contact Author)

Alexandria University - Faculty of Law ( email )

Moustafa Mshrafa st.
Souter
Alexandria
Egypt

Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law ( email )

530 West New York Street, Lawrence W. Inlow Hall
Indianapolis, IN Indiana 46202
United States

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