Issue Linkage, Credible Delegation, and Policy Cooperation

34 Pages Posted: 10 May 2001

See all articles by Giancarlo Spagnolo

Giancarlo Spagnolo

Stockholm School of Economics (SITE); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); University of Rome 'Tor Vergata'; EIEF

Date Written: May 2001

Abstract

This Paper, a thorough revision of Spagnolo (1996), addresses the following questions: What is the optimal design for a set of self-enforcing international policy agreements? How many and which issues should each agreement regulate? Are GATT's constraints on issue linkage (cross-retaliation) welfare-enhancing? To facilitate international cooperation should governments keep policy issues under centralized control, or should they delegate them to independent agencies (e.g. central banks)? In the second case, which issues should be delegated? Finally, institutions allowing governments to credibly delegate policy choices (e.g. to 'conservative' central bankers) are good or bad for international policy cooperation?

Keywords: Cooperation, cross-border spillovers, delegation, international agreements, international institutions, linkages, policy coordination

JEL Classification: E61, F13, F42, H77

Suggested Citation

Spagnolo, Giancarlo, Issue Linkage, Credible Delegation, and Policy Cooperation (May 2001). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=269364

Giancarlo Spagnolo (Contact Author)

Stockholm School of Economics (SITE) ( email )

P.O. Box 6501
Stockholm
Sweden

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/giancarlospagnoloshomepage/

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

University of Rome 'Tor Vergata' ( email )

Faculty of Economics - DEI
Via Columbia 2
Rome, RM 00133
Italy

EIEF ( email )

Via Due Macelli, 73
Rome, 00187
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://WWW.EIEF.IT

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
26
Abstract Views
1,355
PlumX Metrics