Elections and Property Rights: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in Russia

38 Pages Posted: 25 Nov 2015

See all articles by Timothy Frye

Timothy Frye

Columbia University - Department of Political Science; National Research University Higher School of Economics

Andrei A. Yakovlev

National Research University Higher School of Economics

Date Written: November 24, 2015

Abstract

The relative bargaining power of rulers and right-holders is thought to be a key determinant of property rights, but because it both shapes and is shaped by property rights, it is difficult to estimate the impact of bargaining power on property rights. We take advantage of a natural experiment by comparing the responses of managers interviewed just before and just after a surprising parliamentary election in Russia that weakened the relative bargaining power of the ruling party. This electoral shock had little impact on the perceived property rights of the average firm, but firms with close economic ties to the state viewed their property as more vulnerable after the election. By exploiting largely exogenous variation in the timing of survey interviews, we estimate the impact of bargaining power on property rights with greater precision. We also contribute to the literature on elections under autocracy by focusing on their economic, rather than political impacts on individuals.

Keywords: Elections, property rights, hostile takeover, natural experiment

JEL Classification: Z

Suggested Citation

Frye, Timothy and Yakovlev, Andrei A., Elections and Property Rights: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in Russia (November 24, 2015). Higher School of Economics Research Paper No. WP BRP 29/PS/2015, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2695000 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2695000

Timothy Frye

Columbia University - Department of Political Science ( email )

MC3320
420 West 118th Street
New York, NY 10027
United States
212-854-3646 (Phone)

National Research University Higher School of Economics

Myasnitskaya street, 20
Moscow, Moscow 119017
Russia

Andrei A. Yakovlev (Contact Author)

National Research University Higher School of Economics ( email )

Myasnitskaya street, 20
Moscow, Moscow 119017
Russia

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
49
Abstract Views
483
PlumX Metrics