Economic Consequences of Announcing Strategic Alternatives

71 Pages Posted: 4 May 2021

See all articles by Jenny Zha Giedt

Jenny Zha Giedt

George Washington University - School of Business

Date Written: April 27, 2021

Abstract

What are the costs and benefits to a company of publicly announcing it is seeking a potential sale or merger (“strategic alternatives”), and how does the announcement affect long-run shareholder value? The announcement of strategic alternatives is disruptive, generating +5.4% three-day returns on average, and involves a unique cost-benefit tradeoff unlike any other voluntary disclosure. I find that the announcement leads to increased attention from investors and bidders and a more probable and robust M&A sale process (i.e., the benefits of improved transparency). However, I also find that the announcement is a costly public admission of business problems that wears on operations and alienates stakeholders such as customers and employees (i.e., the costs for disclosure to be credible). In addition, I document that the disclosure’s costs and benefits are impounded into long-run stock returns as two countervailing effects, where the net effect of disclosure on firm value depends on whether the company is subsequently acquired. Overall, these results are important because they provide 1) evidence of various channels between a disclosure choice and shareholder value; 2) separate, offsetting estimates of the disclosure’s costs and benefits affecting firm value; and 3) key considerations to investors and company decision makers who would face the consequences of this disclosure decision.

Keywords: corporate disclosure; strategic alternatives; mergers and acquisitions; disclosure costs; disclosure benefits; information transmission; shareholder value

JEL Classification: D82, D84, G14, G34, M41

Suggested Citation

Zha Giedt, Jenny, Economic Consequences of Announcing Strategic Alternatives (April 27, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2695287 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2695287

Jenny Zha Giedt (Contact Author)

George Washington University - School of Business ( email )

Washington, DC 20052
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.jennyzha.com

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