Effective States and Inclusive Development (ESID) Working Paper series, No. 54
36 Pages Posted: 27 Nov 2015
Date Written: October 2015
The challenges facing developing countries with new-found natural resource wealth are generally understood in terms of whether they have the institutions of ‘good governance’ required to avoid the resource curse. New insights from a political settlements perspective show how deeper forms of politics and power relations play a more significant role than such institutions, and help explain some counter-intuitive findings regarding how ‘semi-authoritarian’ Uganda seems to be governing oil somewhat more in line with its national interest as compared to ‘democratic’ Ghana. We find that bureaucratic ‘pockets of effectiveness’ play a critical role, with outcomes shaped by the nature of their embedded autonomy vis-à-vis different kinds of ruling coalition. Efforts to promote ‘best-practice’ governance reforms in such contexts might be misplaced, and could be replaced with a stronger focus on building specific forms of state capacity and a greater acceptance that ‘developmental collusion’ between political and bureaucratic actors may offer more appropriate or ‘best-fit’ solutions.
Keywords: oil, governance, political settlements, Africa, Ghana, Uganda
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Hickey, Sam and Abdulai, Abdul‐Gafaru and Izama, Angelo and Mohan, Giles, The Politics of Governing Oil Effectively: A Comparative Study of Two New Oil-Rich States in Africa (October 2015). Effective States and Inclusive Development (ESID) Working Paper series, No. 54. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2695723 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2695723