The Attack‐And‐Defense Group Contests: Best Shot Versus Weakest Link

10 Pages Posted: 27 Nov 2015

See all articles by Subhasish M. Chowdhury

Subhasish M. Chowdhury

University of Bath - Department of Economics

Iryna Topolyan

University of Cincinnati - Department of Economics

Date Written: January 2016

Abstract

This study analyzes a group contest in which one group (defenders) follows a weakest link, whereas the other group (attackers) follows a best shot impact function (IF). We fully characterize the Nash and coalition‐proof equilibria and show that with symmetric valuation the coalition‐proof equilibrium is unique up to the permutation of the identity of the active player in the attacker group. With asymmetric valuation, it is always an equilibrium for one of the highest valuation players to be active; it may also be the case that the highest valuation players in the attacker group free‐ride completely on a group member with a lower valuation. However, in any equilibrium, only one player in the attacker group is active, whereas all the players in the defender group are active and exert the same effort. We also characterize the Nash and coalition‐proof equilibria for the case in which one group follows either a best shot or a weakest link but the other group follows an additive IF.

JEL Classification: C72, D70, D72, D74, H41

Suggested Citation

Chowdhury, Subhasish M. and Topolyan, Iryna, The Attack‐And‐Defense Group Contests: Best Shot Versus Weakest Link (January 2016). Economic Inquiry, Vol. 54, Issue 1, pp. 548-557, 2016, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2695914 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12246

Subhasish M. Chowdhury (Contact Author)

University of Bath - Department of Economics ( email )

Claverton Down
Bath, BA2 7AY
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/subhasishmc/

Iryna Topolyan

University of Cincinnati - Department of Economics ( email )

Carl H. Lindner Hall 2925 Campus Green Drive
PO Box 0371
Cincinnati, OH 45221-0211
United States

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