Double Bank Runs and Liquidity Risk Management

49 Pages Posted: 27 Nov 2015

See all articles by Filippo Ippolito

Filippo Ippolito

Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences; Barcelona Graduate School of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

José-Luis Peydró

Imperial College London; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences

Andrea Polo

Luiss Guido Carli University - Department of Economics and Finance; Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences; Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF); Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Enrico Sette

Bank of Italy

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 2015

Abstract

By providing liquidity to depositors and credit line borrowers, banks are exposed to double-runs on assets and liabilities. For identification, we exploit the 2007 freeze of the European interbank market and the Italian Credit Register. After the shock, there are sizeable, aggregate double-runs. In the cross-section, pre-shock interbank exposure is (unconditionally) unrelated to post-shock credit line drawdowns. However, conditioning on firm observable and unobservable characteristics, higher pre-shock interbank exposure implies more post-shock drawdowns. We show that is the result of active pre-shock liquidity risk management by more exposed banks granting credit lines to firms that run less in a crisis.

Keywords: credit lines, financial crisis, liquidity risk, risk management, runs

JEL Classification: G01, G21, G28

Suggested Citation

Ippolito, Filippo and Peydro, Jose-Luis and Polo, Andrea and Sette, Enrico, Double Bank Runs and Liquidity Risk Management (November 2015). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10948, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2696138

Filippo Ippolito (Contact Author)

Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain
(+34) 93 542 2578 (Phone)
(+34) 93 542 1746 (Fax)

Barcelona Graduate School of Economics ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, Barcelona 08005
Spain

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Jose-Luis Peydro

Imperial College London ( email )

South Kensington Campus
Exhibition Road
London, Greater London SW7 2AZ
United Kingdom

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Barcelona, Barcelona 08005
Spain
(+34) 93 542 1756 (Phone)
(+34) 93 542 1746 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/joseluispeydroswebpage/

Andrea Polo

Luiss Guido Carli University - Department of Economics and Finance ( email )

Via Kennedy 6
Parma, 43100 - I
Italy

Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain

Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF) ( email )

Via Due Macelli, 73
Rome, 00187
Italy

Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, Barcelona 08005
Spain

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Enrico Sette

Bank of Italy ( email )

Via Nazionale 91
Rome, 00184
Italy

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