Democratic Rulemaking

36 Pages Posted: 30 Nov 2015

See all articles by John M. de Figueiredo

John M. de Figueiredo

Duke University School of Law; Duke University - Fuqua School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Duke Innovation & Entrepreneurship Initiative

Edward Stiglitz

Cornell University - Law School

Date Written: November 2015

Abstract

This paper examines to what extent agency rulemaking is democratic. It reviews theories of administrative rulemaking in light of two normative benchmarks: a “democratic” benchmark based on voter preferences, and a “republican” benchmark based on the preferences of elected representatives. It then evaluates how the empirical evidence lines up in light of these two approaches. The paper concludes with a discussion of avenues for future research.

Suggested Citation

de Figueiredo, John M. and Stiglitz, Edward, Democratic Rulemaking (November 2015). NBER Working Paper No. w21765. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2696851

John M. De Figueiredo (Contact Author)

Duke University School of Law ( email )

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Duke University - Fuqua School of Business ( email )

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Edward Stiglitz

Cornell University - Law School ( email )

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Cornell University
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United States

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