Democratic Rulemaking
36 Pages Posted: 30 Nov 2015 Last revised: 22 Dec 2021
Date Written: November 2015
Abstract
This paper examines to what extent agency rulemaking is democratic. It reviews theories of administrative rulemaking in light of two normative benchmarks: a “democratic” benchmark based on voter preferences, and a “republican” benchmark based on the preferences of elected representatives. It then evaluates how the empirical evidence lines up in light of these two approaches. The paper concludes with a discussion of avenues for future research.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
de Figueiredo, John M. and Stiglitz, Edward, Democratic Rulemaking (November 2015). NBER Working Paper No. w21765, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2696851
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