Do Self-Reporting Regimes Matter? Evidence from the Convention Against Torture

34 Pages Posted: 2 Dec 2015 Last revised: 16 Feb 2016

See all articles by Cosette D. Creamer

Cosette D. Creamer

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Political Science; University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - School of Law; Harvard University - Department of Government; Boston University School of Law

Beth A. Simmons

University of Pennsylvania

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 16, 2016

Abstract

Self-reporting on implementation is common in international regulatory agreements, yet we know almost nothing about how (or whether) it works. We argue self-reporting provides information for international and domestic audiences, with the potential to create pressure for agreement compliance. Using original data on reports submitted to the Committee Against Torture, we test for the influence of the review process on the pervasiveness of torture. Adopting a dynamic approach to strengthen our ability to draw inferences, we find that the review process in fact does help to reduce the incidence of torture in reporting countries. Moreover, local media attention spikes during the review process, consistent with a domestic mobilization mechanism. This is the first study to evaluate the effects of self-reporting on torture outcomes. Since many international agreements are based on self-reporting, the results have broad significance for international relations.

Keywords: international law, self-reporting, international agreements, international treaties, human rights, treaty implementation

Suggested Citation

Creamer, Cosette D. and Simmons, Beth A., Do Self-Reporting Regimes Matter? Evidence from the Convention Against Torture (February 16, 2016). Boston Univ. School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 15-55. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2697730 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2697730

Cosette D. Creamer (Contact Author)

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Political Science ( email )

1414 Social Sciences
267 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - School of Law ( email )

229 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States

Harvard University - Department of Government ( email )

1737 Cambridge St
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Boston University School of Law ( email )

765 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States

Beth A. Simmons

University of Pennsylvania ( email )

3501Sansom
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
7817990076 (Phone)

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
134
Abstract Views
746
rank
161,214
PlumX Metrics