When to Punish, When to Persuade and When to Reward: Strengthening Responsive Regulation with the Regulatory Diamond

Monash University Law Review Vol. 41(1) 2015

27 Pages Posted: 8 Dec 2015

See all articles by Jonathan Kolieb

Jonathan Kolieb

Royal Melbourne Institute of Technolog (RMIT University) - Graduate School of Business and Law

Date Written: November 19, 2015

Abstract

Originally published over two decades ago, ‘responsive regulation’ and its associated regulatory pyramid have become touchstones in the contemporary study and practice of regulation. Influential ideas and theories about regulation and governance have been developed in the intervening years, yet responsive regulation’s simple pyramidal model continues to resonate with policy-makers and scholars alike. This article seeks to advance the vision and utility of responsive regulation, by responding to several key drawbacks of the original design and by offering an update to the pyramidal model of regulation that lies at the centre of the theory. It argues for a ‘regulatory diamond’ as a strengthened, renewed model for responsive regulation. Rooted within the responsive regulation literature, the regulatory diamond integrates into the one schema both ‘compliance regulation' and ‘aspirational regulation’, thereby offering a more cohesive representation of the broad conception of regulation that underpins responsive regulation theory, and the limited but vital role of law within it.

Keywords: responsive regulation; Braithwaite; compliance; aspirational regulation; regulatory theory; regulation; pyramid; diamond

Suggested Citation

Kolieb, Jonathan, When to Punish, When to Persuade and When to Reward: Strengthening Responsive Regulation with the Regulatory Diamond (November 19, 2015). Monash University Law Review Vol. 41(1) 2015, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2698498

Jonathan Kolieb (Contact Author)

Royal Melbourne Institute of Technolog (RMIT University) - Graduate School of Business and Law ( email )

Melbourne
Australia
61399251553 (Phone)

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