Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=2698498
 


 



When to Punish, When to Persuade and When to Reward: Strengthening Responsive Regulation with the Regulatory Diamond


Jonathan Kolieb


RMIT University - Graduate School of Business and Law; Melbourne Law School

November 19, 2015

Monash University Law Review Vol. 41(1) 2015

Abstract:     
Originally published over two decades ago, ‘responsive regulation’ and its associated regulatory pyramid have become touchstones in the contemporary study and practice of regulation. Influential ideas and theories about regulation and governance have been developed in the intervening years, yet responsive regulation’s simple pyramidal model continues to resonate with policy-makers and scholars alike. This article seeks to advance the vision and utility of responsive regulation, by responding to several key drawbacks of the original design and by offering an update to the pyramidal model of regulation that lies at the centre of the theory. It argues for a ‘regulatory diamond’ as a strengthened, renewed model for responsive regulation. Rooted within the responsive regulation literature, the regulatory diamond integrates into the one schema both ‘compliance regulation' and ‘aspirational regulation’, thereby offering a more cohesive representation of the broad conception of regulation that underpins responsive regulation theory, and the limited but vital role of law within it.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 27

Keywords: responsive regulation; Braithwaite; compliance; aspirational regulation; regulatory theory; regulation; pyramid; diamond


Open PDF in Browser Download This Paper

Date posted: December 8, 2015  

Suggested Citation

Kolieb, Jonathan, When to Punish, When to Persuade and When to Reward: Strengthening Responsive Regulation with the Regulatory Diamond (November 19, 2015). Monash University Law Review Vol. 41(1) 2015. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2698498

Contact Information

Jonathan Kolieb (Contact Author)
RMIT University - Graduate School of Business and Law ( email )
Melbourne
Australia
61399251553 (Phone)
Melbourne Law School ( email )
University Square
185 Pelham Street, Carlton
Melbourne, Victoria 3010
Australia
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 257
Downloads: 61
Download Rank: 284,596