Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=2699906
 


 



Institutional Design and Ideas-Driven Social Change: Notes from an Ostromian Perspective


Paul Dragos Aligica


George Mason University - Mercatus Center

Peter J. Boettke


George Mason University - Department of Economics

2011

The Good Society, 2011, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 50-66

Abstract:     
The article takes as a starting point the notion that there are two ways of approaching the issue of ideas and institutional design from an Ostromian perspective. The first is straightforward: simply follow the explicit arguments developed by them and synthesize the main points made over time around concepts such as epistemic choice, institutional levels, and ideas-informed social experiments. We call this the “Level 1” perspective. The “Level 2” perspective is different and, in a sense, indirect: move beyond a mere expository approach and to elaborate several implications and assumptions inherent in the Bloomington scholars’ arguments, but which were not always made fully explicit by them. Once that is done, this perspective links them to some of the explicitly articulated and better recognized points defining their approach. In doing that, the very problem of the relationship between institutional design and social engineering comes to be addressed in a straightforward and edifying way.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 18

Keywords: Ostrom, Institutional Design, Social Change

JEL Classification: P14; P16


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Date posted: December 7, 2015  

Suggested Citation

Aligica, Paul Dragos and Boettke, Peter J., Institutional Design and Ideas-Driven Social Change: Notes from an Ostromian Perspective (2011). The Good Society, 2011, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 50-66. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2699906

Contact Information

Paul Dragos Aligica
George Mason University - Mercatus Center ( email )
3434 Washington Blvd., 4th Floor
Arlington, VA 22201
United States
Peter J. Boettke (Contact Author)
George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )
4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States
703-993-1149 (Phone)
703-993-1133 (Fax)
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