A 'Typus' as an Appropriate Legal Tool for the Interpretation of the 'No Bail-Out' Clause: The 'Private Investor Principle'

European Politeia 2/2015

38 Pages Posted: 9 Dec 2015 Last revised: 10 Dec 2015

See all articles by Katerina Pantazatou

Katerina Pantazatou

Universite du Luxembourg

Michail Rodopoulos

National and Kapodistrian University of Athens

Date Written: December 8, 2014

Abstract

The purpose of this article is to present the academic debate on the interpretation of Article 125 TFEU and to critically demonstrate the jurisprudential controversy that surrounds this provision, both from the CJEU standpoint as well as the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s angle. While we believe that the Court interpreted rightly the provision at issue, we argue that it has left certain questions unanswered. The second part of the article will develop our suggestion regarding the need to construct and adopt a ‘typus’, along the lines and by analogy to the ‘private investor principle’, as an appropriate form of legal reasoning for the interpretation of the ‘no bail-out clause’ proviso, that would allow more legal certainty as to the persisting question of what kind of financial assistance meets the purpose of Article 125 TFEU.

Keywords: No bailout clause, EU crisis, private investor

JEL Classification: K10

Suggested Citation

Pantazatou, Katerina and Rodopoulos, Michail, A 'Typus' as an Appropriate Legal Tool for the Interpretation of the 'No Bail-Out' Clause: The 'Private Investor Principle' (December 8, 2014). European Politeia 2/2015. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2700694

Katerina Pantazatou (Contact Author)

Universite du Luxembourg ( email )

162a, avenue de la Faïencerie
Luxembourg-Limpertsberg, L-1511
Luxembourg

Michail Rodopoulos

National and Kapodistrian University of Athens

5 Stadiou Strt
Athens, 12131
Greece

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