Import Diversion Under European Antidumping Policy

38 Pages Posted: 15 May 2001

See all articles by Jozef Konings

Jozef Konings

Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) - LICOS - Centrum voor Transitie-economie; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Linda Springael

University of Antwerp

Hylke Vandenbussche

Catholic University of Leuven (KUL), CEPR

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 2001

Abstract

This Paper studies empirically the effects of European antidumping actions on import diversion from importers 'named' in an antidumping investigation, and potentially subject to protectionist measures, to countries 'not named' in the investigation. For this purpose we use a unique data set at the 8-digit product level. The amount of import diversion can be regarded as an indication of the effectiveness of antidumping policy, which is used to protect the home industry from foreign imports. We find that trade diversion in the European Union caused by antidumping actions-in contrast to the US-is limited, suggesting that the EU's antidumping policy is more effective in keeping imports out. This result holds even after controlling for selection-bias in the antidumping investigation procedure. A number of explanations for this difference in trade diversion as a result of antidumping policy between the EU and US are formulated.

Keywords: Antidumping measures, econometric resting, trade diversion

JEL Classification: F13, L13, L50

Suggested Citation

Konings, Jozef and Springael, Linda and Vandenbussche, Hylke, Import Diversion Under European Antidumping Policy (May 2001). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=270097

Jozef Konings (Contact Author)

Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) - LICOS - Centrum voor Transitie-economie ( email )

Waaistraat 6 - box 3511
Leuven, 3000
Belgium
+32 16 326 589 (Phone)
+32 16 326 599 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Linda Springael

University of Antwerp ( email )

Prinsstraat 13
Antwerpen, B-2000
Belgium
+32 3 220 41 12 (Phone)

Hylke Vandenbussche

Catholic University of Leuven (KUL), CEPR ( email )

Faculty of Economics
Naamsestraat 69
B-3000 Leuven, 3000
Belgium
+32 16 326 920 (Phone)
+32 16 326 732 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: https://www.sites.google.com/site/vandenbusschehylke/home-1

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