Consistent Collective Decisions Under Majorities Based on Difference of Votes

23 Pages Posted: 11 Dec 2015

See all articles by Mostapha Diss

Mostapha Diss

University of Lyon 2 - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE)

Patrizia Pérez-Asurmendi

University of Valladolid - Grupo de investigaci

Date Written: December 11, 2015

Abstract

The main criticism to the aggregation of individual preferences under majority rules refers to the possibility of reaching inconsistent collective decisions from the election process. In these cases, the collective preference includes cycles and even could prevent the election of any alternative as the collective choice. The likelihood of consistent outcomes under a class of majority rules constitutes the aim of this paper. Specifically, we focus on majority rules that require certain consensus in individual preferences to declare an alternative as the winner. Under majorities based on difference of votes, the requirement asks to the winner alternative to obtain a difference in votes with respect to the loser alternative taking into account that individuals are endowed with weak preference orderings. Same requirement is asked to the restriction of these rules to individual linear preferences.

Keywords: Majorities based on difference of votes, Probability, Transitivity, Triple-acyclicity

JEL Classification: D70, D71

Suggested Citation

Diss, Mostapha and Pérez-Asurmendi, Patrizia, Consistent Collective Decisions Under Majorities Based on Difference of Votes (December 11, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2702309 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2702309

Mostapha Diss (Contact Author)

University of Lyon 2 - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE) ( email )

93, chemin des Mouilles
Ecully, 69130
France

Patrizia Pérez-Asurmendi

University of Valladolid - Grupo de investigaci ( email )

Avda. Valle de Esgueva 6
Valladolid, 47011
Spain

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