Product Hopping and the Limits of Antitrust: The Danger of Micromanaging Innovation
Competition Policy International Antitrust Bulletin, December 2015 (1)
5 Pages Posted: 16 Dec 2015
Date Written: December 14, 2015
In this article on product hopping, we explain that, considering the potential for significant consumer benefits from even small changes in product design, coupled with antitrust agencies and courts being ill-equipped to displace the judgments of consumers (and, with regard to drugs, their doctors) about the value of a new product design, product hopping should be per se lawful absent objective evidence that Product B is a sham innovation with zero or negative consumer welfare effects.
Keywords: product hopping, product switching, antitrust, sham innovation
JEL Classification: K21, L4, L5, L40, L41, L50
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation