Technology Transfer and Cost Structure of Clean Development Mechanism Projects: An Empirical Study of Indian Cases

40 Pages Posted: 15 Dec 2015

See all articles by Nils Simon

Nils Simon

Waseda University

Toshi H. Arimura

Waseda University - School of Political Science and Economics

Minoru Morita

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Akihisa Kuriyama

Institute for Global Environmental Strategies

Kazuhisa Koakutsu

Institute for Global Environmental Strategies

Date Written: December 14, 2015

Abstract

This research empirically estimates abatement costs under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) in India, using project-level data for 830 projects that had been registered as of April 2014. Emphasis lies on assessing the impact of international technology transfer on abatement costs and on testing whether CDM projects in India have experienced a “low-hanging fruits” problem or have benefited from learning effects. The results suggest that projects that include technology transfer have higher abatement costs. However, this does not appear to be universally applicable when assessing technology transfer by project type. Second, no conclusive evidence is found to support a “low-hanging fruits” problem, both empirically and based on the finding that most Indian projects are conducted unilaterally. On the contrary, some project types showed that abatement costs decrease as more projects are implemented. Finally, results suggest increasing returns to scale as well as economies of time in terms of project duration.

Keywords: Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), Technology Transfer, Climate Changes, Low-hanging fruit problem, Renewable Energies

JEL Classification: Q54, Q55, Q56

Suggested Citation

Simon, Nils and Arimura, Toshihide H. and Morita, Minoru and Kuriyama, Akihisa and Koakutsu, Kazuhisa, Technology Transfer and Cost Structure of Clean Development Mechanism Projects: An Empirical Study of Indian Cases (December 14, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2703661 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2703661

Nils Simon

Waseda University ( email )

1-104 Totsukamachi, Shinjuku-ku
tokyo, 169-8050
Japan

Toshihide H. Arimura

Waseda University - School of Political Science and Economics ( email )

1-6-1 Nishi-Waseda
Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 169-8050, Tokyo 169-8050
Japan

Minoru Morita (Contact Author)

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Akihisa Kuriyama

Institute for Global Environmental Strategies ( email )

Kanagawa 240-0198
Japan

Kazuhisa Koakutsu

Institute for Global Environmental Strategies ( email )

Kanagawa 240-0198
Japan

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