Diplomats Want Treaties: Diplomatic Agendas and Perks in the Investment Regime

Forthcoming in Journal of International Dispute Settlement vol. 7, no. 6, 2016

GEG Working Paper 2015/112

29 Pages Posted: 18 Dec 2015 Last revised: 7 Jan 2016

See all articles by Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen

Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen

University College London

Emma Aisbett

ANU - School of Regulation and Global Governance

Date Written: December 16, 2015

Abstract

Literature on the investment treaty regime has shown little interest in diplomatic interests and agendas as drivers of treaty negotiations. This contrasts with other work on international economic relations, such as the negotiation of preferential trade agreements. Our paper fills this gap through a multi-method approach. In line with other areas of economic diplomacy we show that strategic foreign policy considerations have driven some investment treaty negotiations. Secondly, we show that some diplomats have been successful in promoting investment treaties to further their own individual interests. Rooted in public choice theory, this second causal mechanism is often overlooked in literature on economic diplomacy.

Keywords: investment treaties, foreign policy, public choice, negotiations, international political economy

JEL Classification: H77, K33

Suggested Citation

Skovgaard Poulsen, Lauge N. and Aisbett, Emma, Diplomats Want Treaties: Diplomatic Agendas and Perks in the Investment Regime (December 16, 2015). Forthcoming in Journal of International Dispute Settlement vol. 7, no. 6, 2016; GEG Working Paper 2015/112. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2704362

Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen (Contact Author)

University College London ( email )

Gower Street
London, WC1E 6BT
United Kingdom

Emma Aisbett

ANU - School of Regulation and Global Governance ( email )

Canberra, Australian Capital Territory 2601
Australia

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