Information and Small Group Effectiveness in Large Quasilinear Economies

44 Pages Posted: 20 Dec 2015 Last revised: 8 Jul 2017

See all articles by Yusuke Kamishiro

Yusuke Kamishiro

Kanto Gakuin University - College of Economics

Roberto Serrano

Brown University

Myrna H. Wooders

Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics

Date Written: July 7, 2017

Abstract

In large quasilinear economies, we provide sufficient conditions to establish the nonemptiness of several versions of approximate interim cores with endogenous communication. This is done by proving nonemptiness of approximate ex post cores satisfying incentive compatibility. When the number of agents with private information remains finite, the main argument relies on an adaptation of the small group effectiveness condition, previously proposed for games of complete information. Based on a related argument, the result goes through when all agents are informationally small.

Keywords: Asymmetric Information; Large Quasilinear Economies; Small Group Effectiveness; Approximate Cores.

JEL Classification: C71, C72, D51, D82

Suggested Citation

Kamishiro, Yusuke and Serrano, Roberto and Wooders, Myrna H., Information and Small Group Effectiveness in Large Quasilinear Economies (July 7, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2705542 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2705542

Yusuke Kamishiro (Contact Author)

Kanto Gakuin University - College of Economics ( email )

1-50-1 Mutsuura-higashi
Kanazawa-ku
Yokohama, Kanagawa 236-8501
Japan

Roberto Serrano

Brown University ( email )

64 Waterman Street
Providence, RI 02912
United States
401-863-1036 (Phone)
401-863-1970 (Fax)

Myrna H. Wooders

Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics ( email )

Box 1819 Station B
Nashville, TN 37235
United States

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