Download This PaperThe Political Economy of Government Debt
76 Pages Posted: 21 Dec 2015 Last revised: 16 Aug 2024
Date Written: December 2015
Abstract
This paper critically reviews the literature which explains why and under which circumstances governments accumulate more debt than it would be consistent with optimal fiscal policy. We also discuss numerical rules or institutional designs which might lead to a moderation of these distortions.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Alesina, Alberto F. and Passalacqua, Andrea, The Political Economy of Government Debt (December 2015). NBER Working Paper No. w21821, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2706322
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