Executive Branch and Major Electoral Reforms in Russia

19 Pages Posted: 23 Dec 2015

See all articles by Mikhail Turchenko

Mikhail Turchenko

National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow), Students

Sergey Shevchuk

National Research University Higher School of Economics

Date Written: December 22, 2015

Abstract

Within the period of 1993-2014 Russia experienced four major electoral reforms: in 1993, 2002, 2005 and 2014. One more attempt to change the Russian electoral system initiated by the president in 1994-1995 failed. This article considers the cases of major electoral reforms in Russia through the veto player theory. It demonstrates that the reforms were successfully implemented in cases when the executive branch, striving for maximum control over the legislative process, was interested in such implementation and there were no other veto players, who were able to block passage of the law.

Keywords: institutional change, elections, veto players, executive branch, Russia

JEL Classification: D72

Suggested Citation

Turchenko, Mikhail and Shevchuk, Sergey, Executive Branch and Major Electoral Reforms in Russia (December 22, 2015). Higher School of Economics Research Paper No. WP BRP 31/PS/2015. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2707085 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2707085

Mikhail Turchenko (Contact Author)

National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow), Students ( email )

Moscow
Russia

Sergey Shevchuk

National Research University Higher School of Economics ( email )

Myasnitskaya street, 20
Moscow, Moscow 119017
Russia

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