The European Umts/Imt-2000 Licence Auctions

33 Pages Posted: 24 May 2001

See all articles by Philippe Jehiel

Philippe Jehiel

University College London - Department of Economics; Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées (ENPC) - Centre d'Enseignement et de Recherche en Analyse Socio-Economique (CERAS); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Benny Moldovanu

University of Bonn - Chair of Economic Theory II; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: May 2001

Abstract

Europe has taken the global lead in the issuance of third generation (3G) licences for mobile telecommunications according to the UMTS/IMT-2000 family of standards. We survey the recent European UMTS licence auctions and compare their outcomes with the predictions of a simple auction model that emphasises future market structure as a main determinant of valuations for licenses. Since the main goal of most spectrum allocation procedures is economic efficiency, and since consumers (who are affected by the ensuing market structure) do not participate at the auction stage, good designs must alleviate the asymmetry among incumbents and potential entrants by actively encouraging entry.

Keywords: Licence auctions, market entry, UMTS

JEL Classification: D44, D45, L13, L96

Suggested Citation

Jehiel, Philippe and Moldovanu, Benny, The European Umts/Imt-2000 Licence Auctions (May 2001). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=270732

Philippe Jehiel (Contact Author)

University College London - Department of Economics ( email )

Gower Street
London WC1E 6BT, WC1E 6BT
United Kingdom

Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées (ENPC) - Centre d'Enseignement et de Recherche en Analyse Socio-Economique (CERAS) ( email )

28, rue des Saints-Peres
75007 Paris
France
+33 1 4458 2873 (Phone)
+33 1 4458 2880 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Benny Moldovanu

University of Bonn - Chair of Economic Theory II ( email )

Lennestrasse 37
53113 Bonn
Germany
+49 228 736395 (Phone)
+49 228 737940 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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