The Design and Implementation of an International Trading Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emissions

Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, Vol. 18, No. 3, pp. 321-337, June 2000

Posted: 17 Jul 2001 Last revised: 14 Apr 2015

See all articles by ZhongXiang Zhang

ZhongXiang Zhang

Tianjin University - Ma Yinchu School of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Abstract

The inclusion of emissions trading in the Kyoto Protocol reflects an important decision to address climate change issues through flexible market mechanisms. In this paper, we address a number of policy issues that must be considered in designing and implementing an international greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trading scheme. These include how much of a Party's assigned amount of GHG emissions can be traded internationally; emissions trading models; competitiveness concerns in the allocation of emissions permits; banking and borrowing; the issue of liability for non-compliance; enlarging emissions trading system; and bubbles. Although our focus is exclusively on emissions trading, we discuss its relationship with the clean development mechanism, joint implementation and bubbles wherever necessary. By providing some new insights, the paper aims to contribute to the design and operationalization of an international emissions trading scheme.

Keywords: emissions trading, greenhouse gases, climate change, clean development mechanism, joint implementation, Kyoto Protocol, bubbles, banking, borrowing, liability, WTO

JEL Classification: Q25, Q28, Q48

Suggested Citation

Zhang, ZhongXiang, The Design and Implementation of an International Trading Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emissions. Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, Vol. 18, No. 3, pp. 321-337, June 2000. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=270800

ZhongXiang Zhang (Contact Author)

Tianjin University - Ma Yinchu School of Economics ( email )

92 Weijin Road, Nankai District
Tianjin 300072
China
+86 22 87370560 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://ideas.repec.org/f/pzh243.html

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