Are All Security Analysts Equal?

Posted: 5 Sep 2001

See all articles by Carl R. Chen

Carl R. Chen

University of Dayton

Kam C. Chan

Western Kentucky University - Department of Accounting and Finance

Thomas L. Steiner

University of Dayton

Abstract

We examine the extent to which security analysts are homogeneous in their effect on firm valuation as measured by Tobin's Q. Earlier research documents a significant and positive relation between analyst coverage and firm valuation. We identify three classes of equity analysts and examine their differential effect on firm valuation associated with their coverage and their information production. The findings in our paper are that equity analysts are not homogeneous in their effect on firm valuation. We discover the presence of analysts at national securities firms have the strongest effect on firm valuation followed by analysts at regional securities firms and finally analysts at non-brokerage/research firms. We attribute this result to the differential monitoring and information dissemination function rendered by the analysts. Information produced by analysts, however, does not share the same credibility. Specifically, we find brokerage firms' buy recommendations are discounted by the market and have a weak effect on firm valuation. The results can be supported by arguments that brokerage firm analysts' recommendations are contaminated by their firms' investment banking relations with corporations.

JEL Classification: G14, G24, G32

Suggested Citation

Chen, Carl R. and Chan, Johnny and Steiner, Thomas L., Are All Security Analysts Equal?. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=270802

Carl R. Chen (Contact Author)

University of Dayton ( email )

300 College Park
Dayton, OH 45469-2251
United States
937-229-2418 (Phone)
937-229-2477 (Fax)

Johnny Chan

Western Kentucky University - Department of Accounting and Finance ( email )

Bowling Green, KY 42101
United States

Thomas L. Steiner

University of Dayton ( email )

300 College Park
Dayton, OH 45469-2251
United States
937-229-2563 (Phone)
937-229-2477 (Fax)

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