Brownian Signals: Information Quality, Quantity and Timing in Repeated Games

10 Pages Posted: 27 Dec 2015

Date Written: September 21, 2015

Abstract

This paper examines different Brownian information structures for varying time intervals. We focus on the non-limit case and on the trade-offs between information quantity and quality to efficiently establish incentives. These two dimensions of information tend to complement each other when signals quality is sufficiently high. Otherwise, information quantity tends to replace information quality. Any conclusion depends crucially on the rate at which information quality improves or decays with respect to the discounting incentives.

Keywords: Repeated Games, Frequent Monitoring, Information Quantity, Information Quality

JEL Classification: C73, D82, D86

Suggested Citation

Osório Costa, António Miguel, Brownian Signals: Information Quality, Quantity and Timing in Repeated Games (September 21, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2708099 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2708099

António Miguel Osório Costa (Contact Author)

Universitat Rovira i Virgili ( email )

Av. de la Universitat 1
Reus, Tarragona 43204
Spain
(+34)977759891 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://gandalf.fcee.urv.es/departaments/economia/professors/aosorio/

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