Horizontal and Vertical Conflict: Experimental Evidence

68 Pages Posted: 28 Dec 2015 Last revised: 1 Jan 2016

See all articles by Sebastian Galiani

Sebastian Galiani

University of Maryland - Department of Economics

Cheryl Xiaoning Long

Xiamen University

Camila Navajas Ahumada

University of San Andres (UMSA)

Gustavo Torrens

Indiana University

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 27, 2015

Abstract

Two types of political conflicts of interest pervade many of the world’s societies. A horizontal conflict of interest arises when different constituencies support different policies, while a vertical conflict of interest emerges when those in charge of running the government acquire and retain rents in the process of doing so. We experimentally explore the connections between the two. We identify two sets of models that incorporate both types of conflicts: electoral models with endogenous rents, and common-agency models. We adapt these models to a laboratory setting and test their main theoretical predictions using two experiments. In both cases we find support for the proposition that more intense horizontal conflict leads to higher rents, which is one of the theoretical predictions of the parametrized electoral and common-agency models that we have used.

Keywords: Inequality, Conflict, Corruption, Common Agency, Electoral Competition, Rents

JEL Classification: D72, D74, C92

Suggested Citation

Galiani, Sebastian and Long, Cheryl Xiaoning and Navajas Ahumada, Camila and Torrens, Gustavo, Horizontal and Vertical Conflict: Experimental Evidence (December 27, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2708661 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2708661

Sebastian Galiani (Contact Author)

University of Maryland - Department of Economics ( email )

College Park, MD 20742
United States

Cheryl Xiaoning Long

Xiamen University ( email )

Xiamen, Fujian 361005
China

Camila Navajas Ahumada

University of San Andres (UMSA) ( email )

Vita Dumas 284
(1644) Victoria, Pcia
Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires 1644
Argentina

Gustavo Torrens

Indiana University ( email )

Wylie Hall, 100 S Woodland Ave
Bloomington, IN 47405-7104
United States
8128568131 (Phone)

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