Comment of the Global Antitrust Institute, George Mason University School of Law, on the European Commission’s Public Consultation on the Regulatory Environment for Platforms

19 Pages Posted: 1 Jan 2016 Last revised: 7 Jan 2016

See all articles by Joshua D. Wright

Joshua D. Wright

Lodestar Law and Economics

Koren W. Wong-Ervin

Jones Day; George Washington University

Douglas H. Ginsburg

U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit; George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School

Bruce H. Kobayashi

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School

James C. Cooper

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School

Date Written: December 29, 2015

Abstract

This comment is submitted in response to the European Commission’s (EC’s) public consultation on the Regulatory Environment for Platforms, Online Intermediaries, Data, Cloud Computing, and the Collaborative Economy.

The comment addresses: (1) concerns that the EC’s survey methodology and design is not conducive to generating reliable and policy-relevant data; (2) the economic analysis of platforms and multi-sided markets; (3) the dangers to competition and consumers of new ex ante regulation designed to regulate platforms, as opposed to relying upon existing European competition and consumer protection laws to address any potential anticompetitive effects or consumer harm arising from conduct by platform owners; and (4) the economic analysis of privacy and data security and its implications for new regulation.

Keywords: European Commission, two-sided markets, platform, economics, public choice, regulatory capture, privacy, data security, regulation, survey methodology

JEL Classification: K21, L4, L5, C42

Suggested Citation

Wright, Joshua D. and Wong-Ervin, Koren and Ginsburg, Douglas H. and Kobayashi, Bruce H. and Cooper, James C., Comment of the Global Antitrust Institute, George Mason University School of Law, on the European Commission’s Public Consultation on the Regulatory Environment for Platforms (December 29, 2015). George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 15-58, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2709188 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2709188

Joshua D. Wright

Lodestar Law and Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 751
Mclean, VA 22101
United States

Koren Wong-Ervin (Contact Author)

Jones Day ( email )

51 Louisiana Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001
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2028793622 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.jonesday.com/en

George Washington University ( email )

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Douglas H. Ginsburg

U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ( email )

333 Constitution Ave NW
Room 5523
Washington, DC 20001
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George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School ( email )

3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

Bruce H. Kobayashi

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School ( email )

3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States
703-993-8034 (Phone)
703-993-8088 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://mason.gmu.edu/~bkobayas

James C. Cooper

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School ( email )

3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States
703-993-9582 (Phone)

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