Rents from Power for a Dissident Elite and Mass Mobilization

35 Pages Posted: 3 Jan 2016

See all articles by Kemal Kivanc Aköz

Kemal Kivanc Aköz

New York University Abu Dhabi

Pablo Hernandez-Lagos

New York University, Abu Dhabi

Date Written: December 17, 2015

Abstract

We study how rents from power for a dissident group might affect broader public mobilization against the current regime. Our model predicts that rents decrease the incidence of public mobilization when the public observe the group's mobilization. Individuals in the broader public infer the group seeks rents from power only, confusing greed with correct information about the regime's strength. When the public do not observe the group's mobilization, rents increase the incidence of public mobilization because rents facilitate coordination. Our results suggest that recent seemingly spontaneous mobilizations that toppled autocratic governments may have been spurred by dissident groups seeking power.

Keywords: Collective action, regime change, dissident group, global games

JEL Classification: C72; D72

Suggested Citation

Aköz, Kemal and Hernandez-Lagos, Pablo, Rents from Power for a Dissident Elite and Mass Mobilization (December 17, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2710118 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2710118

Kemal Aköz

New York University Abu Dhabi ( email )

New York University Abu Dhabi
Abu Dhabi, Abu Dhabi 129188
United Arab Emirates

Pablo Hernandez-Lagos (Contact Author)

New York University, Abu Dhabi ( email )

PO Box 903
NYC, NY 10276-0903
United States

HOME PAGE: http://pablohernandez-lagos.com

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