Rents from Power for a Dissident Elite and Mass Mobilization
35 Pages Posted: 3 Jan 2016
Date Written: December 17, 2015
We study how rents from power for a dissident group might affect broader public mobilization against the current regime. Our model predicts that rents decrease the incidence of public mobilization when the public observe the group's mobilization. Individuals in the broader public infer the group seeks rents from power only, confusing greed with correct information about the regime's strength. When the public do not observe the group's mobilization, rents increase the incidence of public mobilization because rents facilitate coordination. Our results suggest that recent seemingly spontaneous mobilizations that toppled autocratic governments may have been spurred by dissident groups seeking power.
Keywords: Collective action, regime change, dissident group, global games
JEL Classification: C72; D72
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation