Download this Paper Open PDF in Browser

Reducing Crime Through Expungements

22 Pages Posted: 5 Jan 2016 Last revised: 17 Jun 2017

Murat C. Mungan

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty

Date Written: October 8, 2016

Abstract

Expungements reduce the visibility of a person's criminal record, and thereby reduce the informal sanctions that may be imposed on him. This reduction is enjoyed by the ex-convict only if he does not become a repeat offender, because otherwise he re-obtains a criminal record. Thus, the value a person attaches to having his record expunged is inversely related to his criminal tendency. Therefore, by making expungements costly, the criminal justice system can sort out low criminal tendency individuals -- who are unlikely to recidivate -- from people who have high criminal tendencies. Moreover, the availability of expungements does not substantially affect a first time offender's incentive to commit crime, because one incurs a cost close to the reduction in informal sanctions that he enjoys by sealing his criminal record. On the other hand, expungements increase specific deterrence, because a person who has no visible record suffers informal sanctions if he is convicted a second time. Thus, perhaps counter-intuitively, allowing ex-convicts to seal their records at substantial costs reduces crime.

Keywords: Expungements, criminal tendencies, general deterrence, specific deterrence, second chance

JEL Classification: K14, K4, K42

Suggested Citation

Mungan, Murat C., Reducing Crime Through Expungements (October 8, 2016). Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2017; FSU College of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 786; FSU College of Law, Law, Business & Economics Paper No. 16-2. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2711024 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2711024

Murat C. Mungan (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty ( email )

3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

Paper statistics

Downloads
248
Rank
103,781
Abstract Views
1,062