Malware Counter-Proliferation and the Wassenaar Arrangement

Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Cyber Conflict

19 Pages Posted: 6 Jan 2016 Last revised: 10 Jun 2016

See all articles by Trey Herr

Trey Herr

Hoover Institution at Stanford University

Date Written: January 4, 2016

Abstract

Can states control malware? It’s a radical asymmetry, the power of a modern nation-state arrayed against a few hundred thousand bytes of code and its creators, but an imbalance whose counterintuitive nature impacts the security of citizens, corporations, and governments alike. This paper evaluates export controls targeting malware, found in the Wassenaar Arrangement, in the context of research into the malicious software ecosystem. Highlighting the limitations of export controls to restrict the flow of malware, the paper offers a path forward through clarity of policy goals and enhanced incentives for vulnerability researchers.

Keywords: malware, milware, malware market, cyber crime, export controls, foreign policy, Wassenaar Arrangement

Suggested Citation

Herr, Trey, Malware Counter-Proliferation and the Wassenaar Arrangement (January 4, 2016). Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Cyber Conflict. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2711070 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2711070

Trey Herr (Contact Author)

Hoover Institution at Stanford University ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305-6010
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.hoover.org/profiles/trey-herr

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