Do Dictators Signal Strength with Elections?

58 Pages Posted: 8 Jan 2016 Last revised: 9 Aug 2019

See all articles by Maxim Ananyev

Maxim Ananyev

University of Melbourne - Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research

Michael Poyker

Columbia University - Columbia Business School

Date Written: May 14, 2018

Abstract

What role do elections play in nondemocracies? In this paper, we offer an empirical test of a popular idea that authoritarian governments use elections to engineer overwhelming victories thus deterring potential opposition from challenging the regime. Using the data from the Russian Parliamentary elections in 2011 and a regionally representative public opinion survey, we find that the geographical allocation of electoral manipulation was the opposite of what the theory would imply: more manipulation happened in the areas where the regime was more popular. We also find that higher margins of victory for a pro-regime party failed to deter subsequent mass protests. We argue that these empirical patterns could be better explained not by the efforts of the regime to signal invincibility, but to gather information about public preferences on the support for the regime in the most ex-ante contested areas.

Keywords: Autocracy, Elections, Electoral Fraud

JEL Classification: D72, D78

Suggested Citation

Ananyev, Maxim and Poyker, Mikhail, Do Dictators Signal Strength with Elections? (May 14, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2712064 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2712064

Maxim Ananyev

University of Melbourne - Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research ( email )

Level 5, FBE Building, 111 Barry Street
Parkville, Victoria 3010
Australia

Mikhail Poyker (Contact Author)

Columbia University - Columbia Business School ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.poykerm.com

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