The Limits of Legal Accountability of the European Central Bank

17 Pages Posted: 9 Jan 2016

See all articles by Marco Goldoni

Marco Goldoni

University of Glasgow - Faculty of Law & Financial Studies

Date Written: January 7, 2016

Abstract

The Euro Crisis has granted a new role to the European Central Bank (ECB) on top of the previous one: from regulator of monetary policy in the Eurozone to active participant in the governance of the common currency area. In light of the relevance of the latter role, some of the decisions of the ECB have been predictably challenged in court. This article reviews the Court of Justice of the European Union’s jurisprudence on the status and function of central banking in the EU. It focuses on three decisions (OLAF, Pringle, Gauweiler) to show that the trajectory of the Court has been too deferential toward the ECB. The Court could not change the role and function of the ECB because this would be beyond the scope of legal accountability; yet, the Court ought to have adopted a stricter review of ECB’s decisions and signalled a change in the constitutional function of the ECB to the other European institutions and the European public.

Keywords: Euro Governance, Olaf, Gauweiler, Legal Accountability, European Central Bank

JEL Classification: K10

Suggested Citation

Goldoni, Marco, The Limits of Legal Accountability of the European Central Bank (January 7, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2712240 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2712240

Marco Goldoni (Contact Author)

University of Glasgow - Faculty of Law & Financial Studies ( email )

Glasgow, Scotland
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.gla.ac.uk/schools/law/staff/marcogoldoni/#tabs=0

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
114
Abstract Views
456
rank
240,730
PlumX Metrics