Buying Our Way Out of Corruption: Performance-Based Incentive Bonuses for Developing Country Politicians and Bureaucrats

12 Yale Human Rights & Development Law Journal 160 (2009)

45 Pages Posted: 19 Oct 2016

See all articles by Martin Skladany

Martin Skladany

Pennsylvania State University, Dickinson Law

Date Written: 2009

Abstract

This article argues for the establishment of performance-based financial incentive programs in developing countries that would pay politicians and high-level bureaucrats substantial bonuses (ten to twenty times or more of their official yearly salaries) to reduce corruption within their countries. These incentive programs would turn the weapon of greed back on itself by aligning the motivations of politicians and bureaucrats with the stated goals of government and the desires and will of citizens. Paying corrupt public officials to stop stealing may seem distasteful, but the problems that developing countries face and yet cannot overcome because of systemic corruption are staggering and have been largely resistant to other anticorruption strategies. By simply altering the source of funds to public servants, performance-based incentive programs for developing country politicians and high-level bureaucrats can, over the long run, create a culture of clean governance conducive to sustained economic growth and can make all aspects of development, such as improving infrastructure, education, and health care, more manageable.

Keywords: incentives, corruption, rule of law, institutions, governance, developing countries, economic growth

JEL Classification: O1, O43, K3

Suggested Citation

Skladany, Martin, Buying Our Way Out of Corruption: Performance-Based Incentive Bonuses for Developing Country Politicians and Bureaucrats (2009). 12 Yale Human Rights & Development Law Journal 160 (2009), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2712475

Martin Skladany (Contact Author)

Pennsylvania State University, Dickinson Law ( email )

150 S College St
Carlisle, PA 17013
United States

Do you want regular updates from SSRN on Twitter?

Paper statistics

Downloads
27
Abstract Views
268
PlumX Metrics